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Abstract
We outline three very different concepts of the gene - 'instrumental', 'nominal', and
'postgenomic'. The instrumental gene has a critical role in the construction and
interpretation of experiments in which the relationship between genotype and phenotype
is explored via hybridization between organisms or directly between nucleic acid
molecules. It also plays an important theoretical role in the foundations of disciplines
such as quantitative genetics and population genetics. The nominal gene is a critical
practical tool, allowing stable communication between bioscientists in a wide range of
fields grounded in well-defined sequences of nucleotides, but this concept does not
embody major theoretical insights into genome structure or function. The post-genomic
gene embodies the continuing project of understanding how genome structure supports
genome function, but with a deflationary picture of the gene as a structural unit. This
final concept of the gene poses a significant challenge to conventional assumptions about
the relationship between genome structure and function, and between genotype and
phenotype.
Keywords: Gene definition; gene concepts; postgenomics; history of genetics; conceptual
change
Introduction
The term 'gene' has several different meanings in contemporary biology. Moreover, DNA
sequences that are genes in one legitimate sense of the term may not be genes in another
equally legitimate sense. In this article we will outline three important things that genes
can be:
• Even today, many genes remain what they were in the early days of genetics,
namely, factors in a model of the transmission of a heritable phenotype, or in a
population genetic model of a changing population. The role of 'genes' in these
models is akin to the role of centers of mass in calculating the effects of physical
forces on massive bodies. We will refer to these as 'instrumental' genes (following
Falk 1986).
• Most formal gene names, such as sonic hedgehog (shh), refer to specific DNA
sequences that are annotated as genes because of their similarity to the sequences
that were the focus of study as biologists uncovered the functions of DNA from
the mid-1950s to the 1970s. We refer to these DNA sequences as 'nominal' genes ,
following (following Burian 2004). Many but not all instrumental genes
correspond to nominal molecular genes (and lend them their names), and many
but not all nominal molecular genes correspond to instrumental genes.
• Finally, some genes are collections of DNA elements that play the role of the
gene as envisaged in early molecular biology - acting as templates for the
synthesis of gene products - but which are not 'nominal' genes, because the way in
which DNA is used in the production of the relevant gene products does not fit
the traditional stereotype. In many of these complex cases of genome transcription
the DNA sequences involved can be annotated in different, equally legitimate
ways, producing different numbers of gene or genes with different boundaries.
Because the analysis of these complex cases has become easier in the
'postgenomic era' of massive amounts of sequence data and bioinformatic and
other tools for analyzing that data, we call these 'postgenomic' molecular genes.
The use of the term 'gene' is so complex because it has evolved over time. Newly
discovered phenomenon have necessitated new conceptions of the gene, but the new
conceptions have not displaced earlier conceptions, which often remain the best way to
deal with the classes of genetic phenomena that inspired them. As a result, multiple
conceptions of the gene have come to coexist. In the next section we briefly outline some
of this history.
In the third section of the paper we discuss some of the challenges which the
postgenomic molecular gene poses to conventional views about what genes are and what
they do. We argue that the most general conception of a molecular gene is one that
recognizes that genes - and the 'genetic information' that they contain - are constituted
during development, making the gene a flexible, context-dependent entity. Genes are
'things you can do with your genome'. Classical molecular genes are a special case of this
more general conception.
Our final answer to the question 'what is a gene' consists of this general, postgenomic
vision of the molecular gene, plus a reminder that we cannot do without the older,
instrumental gene, and an acknowledgement of the practical value of the nominal gene.
The evolution of the gene concept
The gene of 'classical' genetics1 had a dual identity (Falk 1986, 2000). The gene was a
postulated physical unit of heredity. But genes were also intervening variables which
allowed prediction of the phenotypes of offspring from the phenotypes of parents. It was
this later conception of the gene with which geneticists were concerned in their actual
scientific work. As T. H. Morgan wrote in his Nobel address, “There is not consensus of
opinion amongst geneticists as to what genes are – whether they are real or purely
fictitious – because at the level at which genetic experiments lie, it does not make the
slightest difference whether the gene is a hypothetical unit, or whether the gene is a
material particle” (1933, quoted in Falk 1986, 148). Recent authors have stressed that
classical genetics should not be thought of as merely a theory of heredity embodied in
Mendel's laws and their later refinements  (Waters 2004; Falk In Press). Instead, this
theory of heredity functioned as an investigative tool with which geneticists could
explore broader biological questions. The 'genetic analysis' of particular phenotypes,
identifying genetic loci related to those phenotypes, sets of alleles at each locus, relations
of linkage and epistasis between loci, and relations of dominance between alleles,
provided data bearing on more general questions about the mechanisms of heredity,
development and physiological function. The aim of genetic analysis was not to test the
theory of the gene, but to answer other biological questions by assuming the theory of the
gene and working out what else must be true to make that assumption consistent with the
results of carefully chosen hybridizations (see the detailed reconstructions in Waters
2004). Research in classical genetics thus resembled Thomas Kuhn's famous
characterization of 'normal science' as the activity of making the world fit the paradigm
(Kuhn 1962). For example, Raphael Falk (1986, 141-145) has discussed how early results
calling into question the 'purity of the gametes' (the doctrine that an allele is not modified
by the allele with which it shares a locus) were reinterpreted to render them consistent
with that important doctrine.
Quantitative characters, like height and weight, which vary continuously between
individuals, posed a significant problem for early genetics, since only a character with
discrete values can appear in Mendelian ratios in offspring. However, as early as 1918
R.A. Fisher had shown that statistical procedures for studying correlations between
phenotypes could be interpreted in Mendelian terms. Quantitative traits are treated as if
they were the effect of a large number of genes each of which makes an equal
contribution to variation in the character. The attitude of the geneticist to these postulated
genes is transparently instrumental.
Michel Morange has written that “Molecular biology was born when geneticists, no
longer satisfied with a quasi-abstract view of the role of genes, focused on the problem of
the nature of genes and their mechanism of action” (Morange 1998, 2). Herman J. Muller
gave a particularly clear statement of the nature of the postulated physical gene. It must
be capable of autocatalysis (self-replication) in order to explain heredity. It must be
capable of heterocatalysis – producing something different in structure from itself – in
order to explain the manifestation of genetic differences in different phenotypes. Finally,
it must be mutable – able to change its structure – so as to create heritable variation upon
which natural selection can act. Investigations of the physical reality of the gene –
beginning with Muller and others' use of X-ray mutagenesis to estimate the size of the
genetic target – mark a significant epistemological development in genetics. Because the
aim of genetic analysis was to analyze phenotypes in terms of underlying genes and their
properties, questioning the core assumptions of the theory of the gene could only result in
intellectual paralysis. Patterns of inheritance which appeared to violate basic Mendelian
assumptions must either be made to fit those assumptions by further genetic analysis, or
accommodated with fudge-factors like 'penetrance' and 'expressivity', or put aside as
anomalies. In contrast, the investigation of genes as physical entities opened up the
possibility of obtaining robust, independent evidence against even the most fundamental
Mendelian assumptions. Features of the gene which were previously treated as
definitional became features which could be tested and potentially rejected.
Before the 1950s the most direct access to the gene as a physical entity was provided by
studies of genetic linkage. It is an obvious implication of the chromosomal theory of
heredity that genes located close together on a chromosome are unlikely to be separated
by crossing over between chromosomes in meiosis, and are thus likely to be inherited
together. The linkage coefficients between genetic loci can be calculated by observing the
results of breeding experiments, allowing the creation of linkage maps. The discovery of
giant, polytenic chromosomes in the salivary glands of Drosophila allowed these linkage
maps to be correlated with the observable patterns of banding in these chromosomes.
Changes in linkage relationships were thus convincingly interpreted as the results of
inversions and translocations of segments of chromosomes. The epistemological result of
this was that a gene could be identified by two different criteria (a) via the phenotypic
difference it makes and (b) as a specific segment of a chromosome revealed by linkage
analysis. This made it possible to discover 'position effects', in which changing the
location of a gene on the chromosome changes its effect on the phenotype. In the hands
of the eminent geneticist Richard Goldschmidt position effects became ammunition
against the 'theory of the gene' itself.
Classical geneticists distinguished between mutations, in which a gene changes its
intrinsic nature, and position effects in which an identical gene has a different effect
because of its location on the chromosome. While these were operationally distinct –
mutations are not accompanied by observable change in the chromosome or by changes
in linkage relationships – Goldschmidt denied that this operational distinction
corresponded to a significant biological distinction. Mutations, he argued, were small
changes in the structure of the chromosome, whilst position effects resulted from larger
changes in the structure of the chromosome. The data did not directly support the idea
that the chromosome is made up of discrete units called genes or that there is a
fundamental difference between a change in one of those units and a larger change in a
chromosome segment. Goldschmidt's call to replace discrete genes by a continuous
chromosome with a hierarchical physical structure was not endorsed by other geneticists
(Dietrich 2000; Dietrich 2000). It demonstrates, however, the way in which the existence
of multiple 'epistemic pathways' to the gene made it possible to use results derived by one
investigative technique to challenge the assumptions underlying another investigative
technique.
The work of Seymour Benzer which led to the establishment of the 'neo-classical' (Portin
1993) or 'classical molecular' (Neumann-Held 1998) concept of the gene made more
successful use of a new pathway to the gene to overthrow some assumptions of the
classical theory. The cis-trans or 'complementation' test is a classical technique for
distinguishing mutations in a single gene from mutations in two different genes. Most
mutations are recessive in the heterozygote. Hence, if an offspring receives a mutant
allele of one gene from one parent and a mutant allele of a second gene from the second
parent, it will also receive a normal allele of the second gene from the first parent and a
normal allele of the first gene from the second parent. As a result, that offspring will be
phenotypically normal. If both mutations are in a single gene, however, the offspring will
receive two mutant copies of the gene, one from each parent, and one containing each
mutation. That offspring will therefore be a phenotypic mutant. The cis-trans test
assumes that recombination - the association of alleles from two homologous
chromosomes of a parent on a single chromosome in the offspring as a result of crossing
over during meiosis - is a process that recombines whole genes. However, if
recombination can occur within a gene, so that part of the gene on one chromosome
comes to be united with part of the same gene from the other homologous chromosome,
then it is possible for the cis-trans test to fail. Intragenic recombination can patch
together a normal copy of a gene from two mutant copies. Obviously, this will happen in
only a very small proportion of cases. During the late 1950s, and using the bacteriophage
(bacterial viruses) that were an important model organism in early molecular biology,
Benzer was able to create a high-resolution analogue of the cis-trans test (see e.g. Holmes
2000 for details) and to systematically detect intragenic recombination. This work
showed that a single classical gene is a linear series of sites at which independent
mutation and recombination events can occur. Benzer proposed replacing the traditional
term 'gene' with three more specific terms, 'muton', 'recon', and 'cistron' – denoting the
units of mutation, of recombination, and of genetic function as defined by the cis-trans
test.
Benzer's work might perhaps have been interpreted as vindicating a Goldschmidt-like
skepticism about dividing the chromosome into discrete genes. But instead, the cistron
was identified with the gene and the other proposed genetic units were not taken up. One
reason for this response was the availability of a chemical model of the gene, due to
Francis Crick, James Watson and others (Olby 1974), which provided a natural
interpretation for Benzer's results. The unit of mutation and recombination is the single
nucleotide, whilst the cistron corresponds to a series of nucleotides involved in the
synthesis of a single gene product through linear correspondences between DNA and
RNA and between RNA and protein. With the unraveling of the genetic code and of the
basic processes of transcription and translation in the 1960s the instrumental and physical
conceptions of the gene seemed to have converged neatly on a single, well-defined entity
- the classical molecular gene. The functional role of the gene had been narrowed down
to contributing to the phenotype through the (heterocatalytic) synthesis of a biomolecule.
The autocatalytic synthesis of gene copies is more properly the function a whole DNA
molecule (chromosome), and mutation and recombination are more properly the function
of individual DNA nucleotides. This refined functional role was occupied by a specific
physical structure – an 'open reading frame' (ORF) – a DNA sequence beginning with a
start codon and ending with a stop codon. Today, it is primarily these sequences which
are formally annotated as genes – sequences which are known or suspected to play the
functional role of the molecular gene and which also have the characteristic structure of
an ORF with adjacent regulatory elements such as the 'TATA box' - a binding site for
transcription factors. Richard Burian has described these as 'nominal genes', a phrase
intended to convey the following ideas, with which we find ourselves strongly in
agreement:  “The use of databases containing nucleotide sequences is well established.
Codified as part of this process is a particular use of gene concepts on the basis of which
one can identify various genes and count the number of genes in a given genome.  … I
call genes, picked out in this way, nominal genes. A good way of parsing my argument is
that nominal genes are a useful device for ensuring that our discourse is anchored in
nucleotide sequences, but that nominal genes do not, and probably can not, pick out all,
only, or exactly the genes that are intended in many other parts of genetic work.” (Burian
2004, 64-5)
The gene of molecular biology is fundamentally the 'image of the gene product in the
DNA'2. The central epistemological role of linear correspondence between molecules in
molecular biology was first emphasized by Kenneth C. Waters (1990; 1994; 2000).
Linear correspondence between molecules is fundamental to biologists’ ability to identify
and manipulate those molecules, via a whole host of technologies such as cDNA
libraries, microarrays and RNA interference, to take a random selection. Linear
correspondence is thus at the heart of the molecular conception of what genes are. The
molecular gene concept is a kind of schema which uses linear correspondence to
elements in some molecule of interest to picks out a certain sequence of DNA nucleotides
as the gene for that molecule. For example, overlapping genes are a common
phenomenon in both prokaryote and eukaryote genomes. What distinguishes the set of
nucleotides that make up one gene from those that make up the second is the relationship
of linear correspondence between these two sets and two distinct gene products. When
two very different products are produced, biologists annotate the sequence as two
overlapping nominal genes. However, when the products are similar they are usually
regarded as alternatively spliced products of a single nominal gene (Alberts et al. 2002,
438; 1994, 457). While this does not invalidate Waters' basic insight, it does suggest that
things are more complicated than his formal model of the gene concept allows, as we
discuss below.
Waters' insight into the epistemological structure of molecular biology illuminates other
concepts as well as that of the gene. An 'exon' was traditionally defined a segment of a
eukaryote gene that is translated into protein. Increasingly, however, an exon is defined
as a segment of a eukaryote gene that makes it through posttranscriptional processing to
form part of the mature mRNA. In early 2005 our Google search for definitions of ‘exon’
yielded twenty-six example, of which sixteen restricted exons to coding sequences3, five
permitted them in untranslated regions of the gene (UTRs)4 and five were unclear on the
point. The difference is significant. On the traditional definition it would makes no sense
to distinguish exons in the untranslated region at either end of a eukaryote gene, and in
2005 it was still possible to find biologists who regarded this as an inappropriate
annotation. It would also make no sense to distinguish exons in sequences which are
transcribed as RNA and never give rise to a protein. However, as biologists have
discovered new classes of functional RNAs, and as interest in the regulatory role of
alternative splicing of untranslated regions has grown, a shift has occurred in the meaning
of ‘exon’. If we looked at the exon concept in the spirit of Waters' analysis of the
molecular gene concept, we would expect this change. Just as the molecular gene is the
set of DNA nucleotides that corresponds to the gene product at whatever stage of interest
is the focus of research, the exons of a gene are the sets of nucleotides that are spliced
together to make the gene product that is the focus of research. As the proportion of the
scientific community whose focus is on post-transcriptional processing of mRNAs rather
than on the post-translational gene product (if any) has grown, the concept of an exon has
been transformed in just the way this analysis would predict.
The classical molecular gene concept was the product of a highly successful attempt to
identify the physical basis of the instrumental gene. However, it was not able to simply
replace the instrumental gene, because that concept is embedded in biological theory, and
in biological practice, in ways that would be artificially and unhelpfully restricted by
replacing the instrumental with the molecular concept. A particularly clear example is
provided by the 'evolutionary gene concept', a generalization of the instrumental gene
concept famously espoused by George C. Williams (1966). The population genetics at the
heart of neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory assumes that the phenotypic differences upon
which selection acts result from individuals having different alleles at various Mendelian
loci, and that changes in the composition of populations over time is fully reflected in
changes in the ratio of different alleles at each locus (there is clearly no difficulty in
generalizing the theory to cover other genetic systems, such as the maternal inheritance of
mitochondrial genes or haplo-diploid systems in which males and females differ in
chromosome number, but for simplicity we will ignore this here).  For the purposes of
population genetics and evolutionary theory, therefore, a gene is anything which causes a
phenotypic difference and which behaves like a Mendelian allele. Hence, Williams
writes, "I use the term gene to mean "that which segregates and recombines with
appreciable frequency."" (1966, 24) The critical property of an evolutionary gene is not
that it codes for a protein, but that is a unit of recombination – a segment of chromosome
which regularly recombines with other segments in meiosis and which is short enough to
survive enough episodes of meiosis for selection to act upon it as a unit (see the careful
elaboration in Dawkins 1982, 86-91). Since the only truly indivisible unit of
recombination is the single nucleotide, the unity of the evolutionary gene is a matter of
degree, but this is no impediment to the use of the evolutionary gene concept in
population biology.
Many chromosome segments which behave as Mendelian alleles, and thus evolutionary
genes, are not nominal genes. Untranscribed regulatory regions, such as 'enhancer' and
'silencer' regions that bind transcription factors acting on genes located thousands of base
pairs away, behave as separate Mendelian alleles and are open to the action of natural
selection. Even 'insulator' regions, which affect gene expression by physically separating
genes and regulatory elements from one another, are potential evolutionary genes. An
adequate evolutionary genetics must deal with all DNA-based heritable differences in
fitness. Restricting the units of evolutionary genetics to coding sequences, or to
indivisible units consisting of coding sequences and their complement of regulatory
regions, would make the theory inadequate to explain evolutionary change. The
evolutionary genes that are not simultaneously nominal molecular genes have their own
'selfish' (Dawkins 1976) evolutionary dynamics and respond to selection on that basis.
Richard Dawkins made this point in an exchange with the molecular biologist Gunther
Stent, who had objected to Williams definition of the gene (Stent 1977). It is surely
unquestionable that we understand genetics better in the light of molecular biology, so
how can we ignore that knowledge in defining the gene? We can do so, argues Dawkins,
because the original Mendelian gene played a number of different roles in biological
theory (as we have already seen in Benzer's distinguishing the units of mutation,
recombination and function) and the growth of biological knowledge has revealed that
these roles are not always filled by the same units (1982, 85-86). The unit of genetic
function is not always the unit of genetic evolution5.
It is not necessary to go to population genetics to find 'genes' that are not nominal genes.
Geneticists continue to make use of classical genetic techniques to identify regions of
chromosome in which nominal genes may be located. Even when the explicit aim of this
work is to identify nominal genes, the conceptualization of the gene that is actually used
to do the work is the classical, instrumental conception. This is shown by the fact that
well-conducted work of this kind, free from any experimental error or errors of reasoning
may locate a candidate 'gene' that does not correspond to a molecular gene, but to some
other functional DNA element, such as an untranscribed regulatory region. As Marcel
Weber concludes, after an insightful comparison of Mendelian and molecular analyses of
Drosophila loci, "even though the classical gene concept had long been abandoned at the
theoretical level, it continues to function in experimental practice up to the present."
(Weber 2004, 223). Consider, for example, a report of the localization of a 'gene for' a
psychiatric disorder to some chromosomal region. Clearly, one way to interpret such a
report is as a prediction that a sequence straightforwardly encoding a protein or a
functional RNA – a nominal gene - will be found at that locus. But it is equally legitimate
to interpret the report as evidence that something about that locus makes a heritable
difference to the disease phenotype. Nor would the fact that the eventual annotation of
the sequence at that locus does not identify a nominal gene necessarily be a criticism of
the earlier work. The instrumental gene concept is alive and well.
The epigenesis of genetic information
We argued in the last section that Waters' analysis of the classical molecular gene concept
rests on a deep insight into the epistemology of molecular biology. But we do not believe
that it provides a fully adequate analysis of the contemporary molecular gene. According
to Waters there is a clear and uniform way to understand genes at the molecular level,
namely as “a gene g for linear sequence l in product p synthesized in cellular context c”
(2000, 544). He recognizes cellular conditions as playing a role in the process of gene
expression but singles out the DNA sequence as having “special determining role because
the differences in the linear structures among different polypeptides synthesized in a cell
or cell structures results from actual differences in the linear structures of the DNA
segment expressed, not from differences in the many other causal agents essential for the
production of the polypeptide” (2000, 543). In this section, we argue contra Waters that
the linear sequence of a gene product in eukaryotes is rarely specified or determined by
its DNA sequence alone. The very high number of alternatively spliced forms expressed
by the human genome argues against Waters' view6 as do all the other distinct novel
transcripts that cannot be accounted for by canonical forms of transcription. Since diverse
sequences in gene products are derived from a single DNA sequence, mechanisms for the
regulation of genome expression must provide additional sequence information. The
main actors of these mechanisms, proteins and functional RNAs, relay environmental
information to the genome with important consequences for sequence selection,
processing and, in extreme cases, sequence creation. Since these selection and creation
mechanisms determine if a given DNA sequence is able to produce a gene product,
arguably the very status of a DNA sequence as a ‘gene’ is dependent on its cellular and
broader context.
We will suggest that in contemporary molecular bioscience genes are not straightforward
structurally defined entities, or even the mixed functional-structural entities defined by
Water's schema given above. Instead, genes are ‘things an organism can do with its
genome’: they are ways in which cells utilize available template resources to create
biomolecules that are needed in a specific place at a specific time(Stotz, Bostanci, and
Griffiths 2006). The same DNA sequence potentially leads to a large number of different
gene products and the need for a rare product calls for the assembly of novel mRNA
sequences. Hence the information for a product is not simply encoded in the DNA
sequence but has to be read into that sequence by mechanisms that go beyond the
sequence itself. Certain coding sequences, plus regulatory and intronic sequences, are
targeted by transcription, splicing and editing factors (proteins and functional RNAs),
which in turn are cued by specific environmental signals. Regulatory mechanisms
determine not only whether a sequence is transcribed, but where transcription starts and
ends, how much of the sequence will be transcribed, which coding and noncoding regions
will be spliced out, how and in which order the remaining coding sequences will be
reassembled, which nucleotides will be substituted, deleted or inserted, and if and how
the remaining sequence will be translated. Many of these mechanisms do not simply
produce alternative protein-coding transcripts. A sequence may be transcribed into
several parallel, coding and noncoding transcripts. The factors that interactively regulate
genomic expression are far from mere background condition or supportive environment;
rather they are on a par with genetic information since they co-specify the linear sequence
of the gene product together with the target DNA sequence. Networks of genome
regulation, including several different kinds of gene products and instructional
environmental resources, specify a range of products from a gene through the selective
use of nucleotide sequence information and, more radically, the creation of nucleotide
sequence information.
To exemplify these general claims we will briefly describe some of these mechanisms
and give examples7. In eukaryotes, the DNA sequence is transcribed into a pre-messenger
RNA from which the final RNA transcript is processed by cutting out large non-coding
sequences, called introns, and splicing together the remaining, mostly but not always,
coding sequences, called exons. Biologists speak of alternative cis-splicing when more
than one mature mRNA transcript results from these processes through the cutting and
splicing of alternative exons8. Beside these canonical splice variants the genome produces
a large variety of transcripts that cannot be so easily attributed to a single nominal gene.
Some transcripts are made of exons from adjacent nominal genes that are 'co-transcribed'
to produce a single pre-mRNA (Communi et al. 2001). Co-transcription may also occur
between a gene and an adjacent ‘pseudo-gene’ rendering the latter capable of providing
part of the coding sequence (Finta and Zaphiropoulos 2000, 2002). Alternative gene
products may also be derived from so-called 'overlapping genes'(Blumenthal et al. 2002).
Until very recently it was thought that only one strand of DNA is transcribed, but in fact
DNA can be read both forwards and backwards by the cellular machinery, producing
either different or matching (complementary) products(Coelho et al. 2002). The latter
case, in which exactly the same sequence is read in reverse, may result in an antisense
transcript with regulatory function, possibly through silencing its complementary
transcript. If two proteins are produced from overlapping genes, their degree of difference
depends on the extent of overlap of coding sequences, and on whether these shared
sequences are read in the same reading frame. It is the precise nucleotide at which
reading begins that determines which codons a DNA sequence contains. Starting at a
different nucleotide is called ‘frameshift’, a phenomenon that would look like this if
applied to an English sentence: ‘A gene is a flexible entity’ becomes ‘Age nei saf lex ibl
een tit y’. But unlike a sequence of letters a DNA sequence will always be made up of
meaningful 'words’ (codons) wherever reading begins. This means that very different
products can be read from the same sequence merely by frameshifting by one nucleotide.
As well as alternative transcripts from a DNA sequence, multiple simultaneous
transcripts can occur, as is the case of the parallel processing of functional non-coding
RNAs (such as microRNAs) from the intronic regions of the initial transcript. These
RNAs may be involved in the regulation of coding transcript of the same gene. In all of
the above instances one can argue that the selective use of nucleotide sequences through a
range of transcriptional and post-transcriptional mechanisms specify or at least co-
determine the linear sequence of the final product.
In the following cases the linear sequence is not mirrored in the DNA sequence at all but
must be created through a variety of post-transcriptional processes. Biologists speak of
trans-splicing when a final mRNA transcript is processed from two or more
independently transcribed pre-mRNAs. While the prefix trans might suggest that these
pre-mRNAs are derived from DNA sequences far apart from each other, this is not
always the case. In fact, two copies of the very same sequence can be spliced together
this way to include multiple copies of the same exons or reverse the order of several
exons in the final transcript. In some cases alternative exons each feature their own
promoter to allow their individual selection for the final transcript. RNA editing is
another mechanism of modification that can significantly diversify the ‘transcriptome’ or
‘proteome’ (the total compliment of final transcripts or proteins in the cells of an
organism). Whereas most other forms of post-transcriptional modification of mRNA
(capping, polyadenilation and cis-splicing) can be said to retain the correspondence of
coding sequence and gene product (even though certain coding and noncoding regions
have been cut out), RNA editing disturbs this correspondence to a large extent by
changing the primary sequence of mRNA during or after its transcription. This creation
of ‘cryptogenes’ via RNA editing can potentially have radical effects on the final product,
depending on whether editing changes the sense of the codon in which it occurs. While
there are likely as many mechanisms of RNA editing as there are organisms, all belong to
one of three principle kinds: the site-specific insertion or deletion of one or several
nucleotides, or nucleotide substitution (cytidine-to-uridine and adenosine-to-inosine
deamination, uridine-to-cytidine transamination)(Gray 2003). Another rather common
mechanism able to disrupt the colinearity between DNA sequence and final product is the
nonstandard translation of mRNA. The three different ways through which the
translational machinery is able to recode the message are frameshifting, programmed
slippage or bypassing, and codon redefinition (Baranov et al. 2003). Although we will not
describe them here, other processes may occur before, during or after the final mRNA
transcript is translated into a protein sequence or processed into a functional RNA. The
relationship between DNA and gene product is indirect and mediated to an extent that
was never anticipated when the basic mechanisms of transcription and translation were
clarified in the 1960s. Figure 1 shows one such 'postgenomic gene’.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Focusing on the cutting-edge of contemporary genomics can induce an extremely
deflationary view of the gene. The classical molecular gene concept was derived from
work on a limited range of organisms: prokaryotes and bacteriophage. Further
investigation of the manner in which a wider range of genomes generate a wider range of
gene products has revealed that the functional role of genes can be filled by diverse,
highly flexible mechanisms at the level of the DNA itself. Our increased comprehension
of the structure and organization of the genetic material has “left us with a rather abstract,
open and generalized concept of the gene” (Portin 1993, 173), or as Falk was already
suggesting 20 years ago, “Today the gene is […] a unit, a segment that corresponds to a
unit-function, as defined by the individual experimentalist’s need. It is neither discrete
[…] nor continuous […], nor does it have a constant location […], nor a clearcut function
[…], not even constant sequences […] nor definite borderlines.” (Falk 1986, 169) In the
light of our current understanding of genome structure and function some have even
conclude that Goldschmidt’s critique of the particulate gene has been vindicated: “The
particular gene has shaped thinking in the biological sciences over the past century. But
attempts to translate such a complex concept into a discrete physical structure with
clearly defined boundaries were always likely to be problematic, and now seem doomed
to failure. Instead, the gene has become a flexible entity with borders that are defined by
a combination of spatial organization and location, the ability to respond specifically to a
particular set of cellular signals, and the relationship between expression patterns and the
final phenotypic effect” (Dillon 2003, 457). Some molecular biologists, realizing that the
concepts of gene transcription or gene expression may not suffice to capture the complex
architecture of the transcriptome of many eukaryotes have proposed the more general
term of 'genome transcription' to allow for the incorporation of RNA transcripts that
contain sequences outside the border of canonical genes. This view does not sit easily
with the classical molecular conception of genes, which from the new perspective seem
like “statistical peaks within a wider pattern of genome expression” (Finta and
Zaphiropoulos 2001, 160).
One pragmatic, technological reason that today’s biologists are prepared to consider such
radical options is that the challenge of automated gene annotation has turned the
apparently semantic issue of the definition of ‘gene’ into a pressing and practical one as
the limitations of a purely structural, sequenced-based definition of the gene have become
apparent. According to some, one “possible consideration stemming from the growing
list of transcribed regions of the genome is the likelihood that the present efforts in
estimating the total number of genes in the genome is misguided and at the very least
miscalculated. These efforts are misguided given the discussion presented previously that
a more useful entity to be counted is the number of transcripts. They are also
miscalculated because such estimates are biased strongly in favor of protein- coding
transcripts” (Kampa et al. 2004, 341)}. Recent investigations of the complexities of the
human transcriptome support this view. One study revealed a large number of
transcriptional events, 60% of which involve novel transcriptional units outside annotated
genic regions, and the rest of which involve newly discovered exons or exon isoforms of
known genes. This study detected overlapping transcription on the positive and negative
strand in 60% of the surveyed loci, and a variety of intronic transcriptional fragments and
intergenic transcription. If correct, these results have important implications for the
definition of a gene, and for the relationship between genotype and phenotype. (Kapranov
et al. 2005).
Conclusions
The gene began life as an intervening variable, defined functionally by the Mendelian
pattern of heredity, and rapidly acquired a second identity as a hypothetical material unit.
A productive dialectic between functional and structural conceptions of the gene
concluded with the ‘classical molecular’ conception of the gene, which fused structure
and function in a single definition. Further investigation of a wider range of genomes and
a wider range of gene products suggests that the structural basis upon which gene-like
functions are performed may be very broad. At this point in time, then, it is necessary to
distinguish between (at least) three senses of ‘gene’:
1. The traditional, instrumental gene retains a critical role in the construction and
interpretation of a range of experiments in which the relationship between genotype
and phenotype is explored via hybridization between organisms or directly between
nucleic acid molecules. It also retains an important theoretical role in the foundations
of disciplines such as quantitative genetics and population genetics. While these areas
of the biosciences are in a continuous and fruitful exchange with work that utilizes
molecular conceptions of the gene, to attempt to reduce instrumental genes to
molecular genes is to misunderstand the epistemological role of the instrumental
gene.9
2. The nominal molecular gene is a critical practical tool, allowing stable
communication between bioscientists in a wide range of fields grounded in well-
defined sequences of nucleotides. But this does not imply that the scientific
community has a clear understanding of what makes a sequence a gene that needs
only to be made explicit. Thomas Fogle has argued powerfully that this is not the case
(Fogle 2001). The concept of the gene used in sequence annotation is something like
a stereotype or prototype: a sequence is a gene if it has enough similarities to other
genes, e.g. it contains an open reading frame, has one or more promoters, has one or
more transcripts which are not too functionally diverse from one another, etc. This is
more or less a description of automated ‘gene discovery’ methods, and Fogle’s
suggestion is that the working concept of the gene is no more principled or definition-
like than this. The various ‘gene-like’ features are not weighted against one another in
any principled, theory-driven way, but rather are weighted differently on different
occasions in order to segment the DNA sequence into fairly traditional looking
‘genes’, sometimes giving up on structural criteria to save functional ones (as in cases
of trans-splicing), at other times giving up on functional criteria to save structural
ones (as in co-transcription of a gene and a ‘pseudo-gene’). Thus, while the nominal
gene is an important practical tool, the nominal gene concept does not constitute a
major theoretical insight into genome structure or function.
3. The postgenomic molecular gene embodies the continuing project of understanding
how genome structure supports genome function, but with a deflationary picture of
the gene as a structural unit. The techniques with which we identify and manipulate
biomolecules continue to rely on correspondences between those molecules and the
DNA sequences from which their precursors were transcribed. In that sense, the
genome is still thought of as containing an 'image’ of its product, even if that image is
fractured and distorted, and even if it is only one factor in determining the sequence
of elements in the product (see Figure 1). However, the new concept poses a
significant challenge to conventional assumptions about the relationship between
genome structure and function, and hence between genotype and phenotype. We have
suggested that an adequate general conception of the molecular gene must
acknowledge that genes are defined by the way DNA sequences are used in particular
cellular and broader contexts, and not merely by their structure. Genes that can be
recognized by their structure alone are a special case of this more general concept.
Indeed, as shown in Figure 1, the very same gene (by the important criteria of descent
from a common ancestral gene and conserved function) may be recognizable by
traditional structural criteria in one organism and unrecognizable in another. Hence it
is no longer possible to think of the transcriptome as ‘preformed’ in the genome.
Rather than reading off transcripts from their images in the DNA, those images are
discerned in the DNA only with the help of the transcripts which the wider cellular
system has used them to produce (for a similar view, see Snyder and Gerstein 2003).
We also believe that the nature of the postgenomic gene supports the view that
phenotypes are not simply expressions of genetic information but rather emerge from a
'developmental system' (Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray 2001) that encompasses many
aspects of what would traditionally be regarded as the environment, but this is not the
place to defend this broader view, and our claims about the gene concept do not depend
upon it.
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Notes
1  The period roughly bounded by Thomas Hunt Morgan's 'The Theory of the Gene'
(1917) and Seymour Benzer's work on fine-structure mapping in the late 1950s.
2 A phrase we owe to Rob D. Knight (pers. comm.)
3 E.g. "The parts of the DNA sequence that code for proteins. Compare with intron"
Baylor College of Medicine www.bcm.edu/pa/genglossary.htm
4 E.g. "One of the parts of a gene whose sequence is present in the mature mRNA"
University College London  http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~ucbhjow/b241/glossary.html
5 Dawkins goes too far, however, when he defines the evolutionary gene as any segment
of chromosome: 'When I said 'arbitrarily chosen portion of chromosome', I really meant
arbitrarily. The twenty-six codons I chose might well span the border between two
cistrons' (1982, 87) The objections to this extreme position are discussed by Sterelny and
Griffiths (1999, 79-82)
6 “Based on data from Chromosomes 21 and 22, there is a distinct possibility that nearly
all of the coding genes of the genome exhibit alternatively spliced forms.” (Kampa et al.
2004, 340)
7 (See also Stotz and Griffiths 2004; Stotz, Bostanci, and Griffiths In Press and our
website http://representinggenes.org).
8 In contemporary usage, cis- elements are those transcribed together as parts of a single
pre-mRNA whereas trans- elements are transcribed separately and united at some stage
of post-transcriptional processing (trans-splicing). Thus trans- elements in the modern
sense (trans on mRNA) may be cis- located in the older sense referred to in the second
section of this paper (cis on the DNA).
9 For an important recent attempt to distinguish and analyse the complimentary
epistemological roles of instrumental and physical genes, see (Moss 2003)
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Figure 1. An example of a 'postgenomic' gene (lines denote introns, boxes denote exons).
Subunit 1 of the respiratory chain NADH dehydrogenase is encoded by the gene nad1,
which in the mitochondrial genomes of flowering plants is fragmented into five coding
segments that are scattered over at least 40kb of DNA sequence and interspersed with
other unrelated coding sequences. In wheat (illustrated) the five exons that together
encode the polypeptide of 325 amino acids, require one cis-splicing event (between the
exons b/c) and three trans-splicing events (between exons a/b, c/d and d/e) for assembly
of the open reading frame. In addition, RNA editing is required, including a C to U
substitution to create the initiation codon for this ORF. In some mosses and in mammals
the ORF for NAD1 is an uninterrupted stretch of nuclear genomic DNA. Finally, in
wheat, a separate, ORF for a maturase enzyme (mat-r) is encoded in the intron upstream
of exon e (Chapdelaine and Bonen 1991).
